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Abstract
A preference-theoretic characterization of weak complementarity is provided based
on an explicit representation of revealed preference. Weak complementarity is deﬁned
in terms of the observable property of nonessentiality and the unobservable property of
no existence value. Preference-theoretic characterizations of these properties facilitate a
precision and intuition that is not generally available within the existing calculus-based
literature. An exact welfare measure is speciﬁed that does not require a continuous
nonmarket good or monotonic preference on the nonmarket good, and which can be
easily generalized to accommodate inﬁnite choke prices. It is shown that no existence
value can be rejected by revealed preference, contradicting a widely stated assertion
within the literature. Even though no existence value is unobservable, it does require
an observable condition that is nontrivial with three or more market goods.
Keywords: Weak complementarity, Preference-theoretic, Testing preference restric-
tions, Nonessentiality, No existence value, Discrete nonmarket goods, Inﬁnite choke
prices.
i1 Introduction
A core methodological problem of nonmarket goods is that revealed preference from mar-
ket demand does not by itself provide suﬃcient information for welfare analysis. There are
several diverse methodological approaches for providing the necessary additional preference
information. One approach involves imposing intuitively appealing preference assumptions,
typically called “preference restrictions” or “maintained hypotheses.” The principal exam-
ple is weak complementarity as introduced by M¨ aler.1 Weak complementarity has always
been implemented with calculus-based techniques. In this paper I instead use a preference-
theoretic methodology to characterize weak complementarity based on an explicit repre-
sentation of revealed preference. Weak complementarity is deﬁned in terms of the observ-
able property of nonessentiality and the unobservable property of no existence value. The
preference-theoretic characterizations of these properties facilitate a precision and intuition
that is not generally available with the existing calculus-based literature. An exact welfare
measure is speciﬁed that does not require a continuous nonmarket good or monotonic pref-
erence on the nonmarket good, and which can also be easily generalized to accommodate
inﬁnite choke prices. When there are three or more market goods, it is shown that the
unobservable assumption of no existence value can be rejected by revealed preference.
I begin by establishing the ties between a preference-theoretic approach and the usual
calculus treatment with utility functions. Let z represent a nonmarket good that can take
on any values of the set Z. A nonmarket good may be discrete or continuous, and the
values it takes on might be scalars, vectors, or even non-numerical attributes such as Z =
{Poor Fishery, Thriving Fishery}.2 Superscripts are used to distinguish individual elements
of Z, as in za,zb ∈ Z. Let X = ℜL
+ be the commodity consumption set with typical element
x = (x1,...,xL), and deﬁne Y = X × Z with typical element (x,z). The consumer is
assumed to have a complete preference relation on Y , designated by %Y , which is typically
represented by a utility function uY so that uY(xa,za) ≥ uY(xb,zb) ⇐⇒ (xa,za) %Y (xb,zb)
for all possible pairs of (x,z) vectors (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y . I assume that %Y is complete and
transitive on Y , and also continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone on X.
Usually the demand function is deﬁned as the solution function to the constrained opti-
1The concept was ﬁrst fully developed in M¨ aler (1971) and the terminology was introduced in M¨ aler
(1974).
2M¨ aler’s ﬁrst example was ﬁshery quality, although as a continuous variable.
1mization problem,
max
x
uY (x,z) (1)
s.t. p   x ≤ w,
x ∈ X,
where p ∈ ℜL
++ is the vector of market good prices and w > 0 is the individual’s wealth.3
However the demand function can also be characterized in purely preference-theoretic terms,
b x(p,z,w) = {x ∈ X |p   x ≤ w, and (x,z) %Y (¯ x,z) for all ¯ x such that p   ¯ x ≤ w}. (2)
For each value of z, the consumer chooses the preference maximizing aﬀordable commodity
bundle so the nonmarket good essentially parameterizes the choice problem and the demand
function (as do prices and wealth).
2 The problem of missing preference information
Suppose that there is a change in the nonmarket good “value” from za to zb with price and
wealth respectively ﬁxed at ¯ p and ¯ w, and we wish to measure the change in welfare. Typically
this means ﬁnding some dollar value change in wealth that is either equivalent to the change
in z or compensates for this change.4 Working with the latter option, the change in welfare
∆W may be characterized either with preference notation or with the utility function,
(b x(¯ p,z
a, ¯ w),z
a) ∼Y
￿
b x
￿
¯ p,z
b, ¯ w − ∆W
￿
,z
b￿
, (3)
uY (b x(¯ p,z
a, ¯ w),z
a) = uY
￿
b x
￿
¯ p,z
b, ¯ w − ∆W
￿
,z
b￿
, (4)
where ∼Y is the indiﬀerence relation associated with %Y .5 With or without utility function
representation, this requires preference information across diﬀerent z values. That is, for
3Following Mas-Colell et al. (1995), I use wealth instead of income. The seminal M¨ aler (1971) uses “lump
sum income” which is arguably more akin to wealth than income.
4These are equivalent variation and compensating variation respectively. See Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
for the standard deﬁnition of these metrics, i.e., without nonmarket goods. Larson (1991), Bockstael and
McConnell (1993), Herriges et al. (2004), Smith and Banzhaf (2004), and Bullock and Minot (2006) use a
compensating variation measure for a change in the nonmarket good value that is the same as the one used
here, while Ebert (1998) uses an equivalent variation measure.
5That is, (xa,za) ∼Y (xb,zb) ⇐⇒
￿
(xa,za) %Y (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %Y (xa,za)
￿
for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈
Y .
2at least some pairs (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y with za  = zb we need to know whether or not
(xa,za) %Y (xb,zb). However, this information is not available from revealed preference.
Consumers reveal their preference as they choose diﬀerent commodity bundles for various
given combinations of p, z and w, as indicated by program (1) and equation (2). Since they
are not able to choose z values in the market, revealed preference is not available for diﬀer-
ences in these values. Furthermore, commodity revealed preference is only available across
those bundles that the consumer might actually obtain as indicated by the demand function.
For each z ∈ Z, the obtainable set in X is b Xz = {x ∈ X |x = b x(p,z,w) for some (p,w) ∈
ℜ
L+1
++ }.6 For each such z value, I assume that revealed preference provides a complete pref-
erence relation on b Xz.7 Thus for each z ∈ Z, we have a preference relation %z such that
for any xa,xb ∈ b Xz we know whether or not xa %z xb. From the properties of %Y we
also know that each %z is transitive, continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotone.
As part of this assumption there are also representative utility functions uz(x) such that
uz(xa) ≥ uz(xb) ⇐⇒ xa %z xb.8,9 Without loss of generality, I assume that these util-
6Three illustrative examples: 1) With Cobb-Douglas or CES preference, the obtainable set is the strictly
positive orthant ℜL
++ so that at least of some of each commodity is always consumed. 2) With Leontief pref-
erence the obtainable set is a ray from the origin (not including the origin). 3) With quasilinear preference,
the obtainable set will typically include some commodity vectors with no consumption of some goods, i.e.,
corner solutions. This distinction between X and the obtainable subset is also used by Richter (1971).
7For example, these might be obtained by solving the integrability problem (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)).
This is the strongest assumption adopted in this paper. With it I have eﬀectively assumed away all possible
problems associated with recovering revealed preference for the standard situation with only market goods,
i.e., without nonmarket goods. I have thereby narrowed the focus to those new problems that accompany
the inclusion of nonmarket goods.
8The use of z as an index on %z and uz(x) might suggest that Z is a countable set. However as I indicated
previously, z may be a real valued continuous variable or even a real vector. In that context, %z and uz(x)
would probably be obtained as a parametric continuum.
9The individual uz utility functions are generally not restrictions of the original unknown utility function
uY (x,z) to changes in x, as in uz(x) = uY (x,z). More precisely, we have no basis for knowing that
they are, as otherwise we will have recovered uY (x,z) and there would be no problem with nonmarket
good welfare analysis. However, there is a relationship between these two types of utility functions (one
unknown to the analyst and the other known). Let z ∈ Z. Then for any xa,xb ∈ b Xz we must have
￿
uY (xa,z) ≥ uY (xb,z)
￿
⇐⇒
￿
uz(xa) ≥ uz(xb)
￿
. This can also be stated in terms of z-speciﬁc monotonic
transformations. For each z ∈ Z there is some real valued function fz such that fz (uY (x,z)) = uz(x) for all
x ∈ b Xz.
This discussion is illustrative of the complexity that is introduced with utility functions but not present
with pure preference-theoretic work. All of the core ﬁndings of this paper could be developed and stated
3ity functions are continuously diﬀerentiable. The set {%z |z ∈ Z} represents all available
revealed preference.
From the set of all b Xz we can deﬁne the overall obtainable subset of Y , b Y = {(x,z) ∈
Y |x ∈ b Xz for z ∈ Z}. I will use the notation %b Y to indicate the restriction of %Y to
the preference subdomain b Y .10 For welfare analysis we are only concerned with elements
of Y that might actually occur with market interaction, i.e., those that can be obtained
with the demand function. Thus at most, we are only interested in identifying the complete
preference relation on b Y , %b Y . However what we have available is much less than this. For
any given z ∈ Z and any xa,xb ∈ b Xz, we know whether or not (xa,z) %b Y (xb,z) since
xa %z xb ⇐⇒ (xa,z) %b Y (xb,z). However, for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y with za  = zb, we
cannot determine whether or not (xa,za) %b Y (xb,zb). This preference information is not
available from revealed preference. Thus our knowledge of preference on b Y is incomplete,
and we are in particular missing preference information that is necessary to consider welfare
issues involving distinctions in the value of the nonmarket good, such as ﬁnding the value of
∆W.
The missing preference information problem is illustrated by Figure 1, where %za and
%zb are depicted for some za,zb ∈ Z with za  = zb, X = ℜ2
+ and b Xza = b Xzb = ℜ2
++. These
two revealed preference relations are respectively represented by the Ia
i and Ib
i indiﬀerence
curves. We know, for example, that all the points in Ia
5 are preferred to the points in Ia
3 and
all the points in Ib
4 are preferred over the elements of Ib
1. However from revealed preference
alone, we do not know whether or not the consumer prefers the points of Ia
5 (with z = za)
over those of Ib
3 (with z = zb). The problem is then identifying the remaining preference
information that will enable us to compare the indiﬀerence curves in panel (a) with those in
panel (b).
We can deﬁne a complete preference relation on b Y by specifying a complete one-to-one
alignment between the z-speciﬁc sets of indiﬀerence surfaces that honors transitivity. For
example with Figure 1, this might include associating Ia
i with Ib
i for all i = 1,...,5, or
we might instead associate Ia
1 ∼ Ib
3 and Ia
2 ∼ Ib
5.11 However, we cannot associate Ia
1 ∼ Ib
3
more simply without any direct reference to utility functions. The most important role of utility functions
here is that they permit comparison with a literature that is based on calculus methodology.
10Thus for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y , (xa,za) %b Y (xb,zb) ⇐⇒ (xa,za) %Y (xb,zb).
11With these two examples we only have partial alignments, involving the depicted sampling of indiﬀerence
curves, and hence are unable to specify a complete relation on b Y with Z = {za,zb}.
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(b) Revealed preference with z = zb
Figure 1: Revealed preference with alternative nonmarket good values.
and Ia
2 ∼ Ib
2, as this would violate transitivity.12 For each z ∈ Z, let Iz = {Iz
i }∀i be the
set of all %z indiﬀerence surfaces, and let I =
S
z Iz be the union of these sets. Then a
complete one-to-one alignment between all Iz is a partition of I, P = {Pj}∀j such that each
Pj includes exactly one indiﬀerence surface of Iz for each z ∈ Z.13 If the partition also
honors transitivity, then a preference relation on b Y can be constructed by treating each Pj
as an equivalence class. In section 4 I use a complete one-to-one alignment based on weak
complementarity to construct a complete preference relation on b Y .
3 Weak complementarity properties
Weak complementarity is one method for providing the necessary preference information
not available through revealed preference and thereby make welfare analysis possible. It is
built on an relationship between the nonmarket good and one of the market goods. M¨ aler’s
ﬁrst example was the relationship between the quality of a public ﬁshery and sport ﬁshing
12With the observed Ia
2 ≻ Ia
1 and Ib
3 ≻ Ib
2, the ﬁrst association Ia
1 ∼ Ib
3, and transitivity, we obtain Ia
2 ≻ Ib
2
which contradicts the second association Ia
2 ∼ Ib
2.
13The i and j indexes of Iz
i and Pj do not imply that they are countable. They are always uncountable.
5(nonmarket and market good respectively). Bockstael and McConnell (1993) provide two
examples including wildlife populations in a sanctuary and trips to the sanctuary. In some
presentations the nonmarket good is a quality of the market good, while others simply
require that they be “consumed” together. Without loss of generality, I shall assume that
the nonmarket good is associated with the ﬁrst market good, x1. Given this relationship,
weak complementarity requires two preference properties, one which may be observed from
revealed preference and another which is imposed as a preference assumption. This second
property is thus a “preference restriction” or “maintained hypothesis.” Neither property is
consistently deﬁned in the literature.14
The ﬁrst property is nonessentiality. Willig (1978) originally deﬁned it as requiring that
“any bundle including good 1 can be matched in the preference ordering by some other
bundle which excludes good 1.”15 Formally, for any xa ∈ X and z ∈ Z there must exist
some xb = (xb
1,...,xb
L) ∈ X with xb
1 = 0 such that (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z), or in terms of utility,
uY(xa,z) = uY(xb,z). I shall call this property weak nonessentiality.
Most of the weak complementarity literature instead requires a stronger property that I
shall also adopt.16 Modifying Willig’s deﬁnition, with strong nonessentiality, “any demanded
bundle including good 1 can be matched in the preference ordering by some demanded bundle
which excludes good 1.” Thus the distinction is that we are restricting ourselves to those
commodity vectors that can be obtained via the demand function. Holding wealth constant,
this requires that for any pa ∈ ℜL
++, w > 0 and z ∈ Z there must exist some pb ∈ ℜL
++
such that with the ﬁrst component demand function b x1(pb,z,w) = 0 and (b x(pa,z,w),z) ∼Y
￿
b x(pb,z,w),z
￿
. With our previously deﬁned obtainable sets we can state this more simply
as requiring that for any z ∈ Z and any xa ∈ b Xz, there must exist some xb ∈ b Xz with xb
1 = 0
14Bullock and Minot (2006) provide an interesting analysis of alternative deﬁnitions of weak complemen-
tarity in terms of the implied path of integration.
15The word “other” is not actually operational in the deﬁnition so that the two bundles can be the same.
von Haefen (2007) provides an equivalent characterization of nonessentiality.
16The literature actually tends to be quite vague on nonessentiality. It is sometimes not explicitly con-
sidered while clearly still an implicit requirement such as with Larson (1991), Herriges et al. (2004), and
Bullock and Minot (2006). Others, such as Smith and Banzhaf (2004) initially state it in terms Willig’s orig-
inal characterization but in their analysis clearly require the stronger version adopted here. My statement of
strong nonessentiality is equivalent with the characterizations provided by Bockstael and McConnell (1993),
and Palmquist (2005).
6such that (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z).17 We then also have (xa,z) ∼b Y (xb,z) and xa ∼z xb.
With weak nonessentiality but without strong nonessentiality, intersection points such as
xb are not members of the obtainable sets, b Xz. Both weak and strong nonessentiality can be
directly observed with revealed preference. The distinctions between the two characterization
of nonessentiality are illustrated in Figure 2. First in panel (a), the indiﬀerence curves do
not touch the vertical axis so that neither characterization is satisﬁed. In panel (b) the
indiﬀerence curves touch the vertical axis and obtain tangents there.18 This satisﬁes Willig’s
deﬁnition but not the more widely used deﬁnition of nonessentiality as it not possible to
obtain any of these points as demand.19 Finally in panel (c) the indiﬀerence curves intersect
the vertical axis with ﬁnite slopes. These points can be obtained with positive real prices,
satisfying both weak and strong nonessentiality. With wealth and other prices ﬁxed, the
choke price for good one is the minimal price for which the consumption of good one is zero.
The three panels of Figure 2 respectively illustrate no choke prices, inﬁnite choke prices and
ﬁnite choke prices. Choke prices are discussed further in section 5.
No existence value is the second required preference property for using the weak com-
plementarity method for nonmarket good welfare analysis.20 This property tells us that the
consumer does not care about the value of z when the consumption bundle is ﬁxed with
x1 = 0. Thus the nonmarket good does not have any stand-alone existence value, but rather
has only use value in conjunction with the consumption of good one.21 Beginning with M¨ aler
(1971), this property is typically formally deﬁned by the partial diﬀerential equation,
∂uY
∂z
(0,x2,x3,...,xL,z) = 0. (5)
17A conjecture: Let X0
1 be the subset of X where x1 = 0, X0
1 = {x ∈ X |x1 = 0}. Then I believe that
strong nonessentiality is equivalent to the requirement that X0
1\{0} ⊂ b Xz for all z ∈ Z.
18Depending on how tangency is deﬁned, these might not be considered tangents since the indiﬀerence
curves also end at these points. However the intuition of a common slope is preserved. Tangents like this
may occur with CES preference.
19This is a consequence of our requirement for positive real valued prices. Demand could only be obtained
at these points of tangency with the vertical axis if the price of good one were inﬁnite or the price of good
two were zero.
20Beginning with M¨ aler (1974), weak complementarity is deﬁned in most of the literature as the property
that I call no existence value. However the need for both properties is often not clear in these presentations.
My two-property deﬁnition of weak complementarity follows Palmquist (2005) and von Haefen (2007), and
facilitates a more clear understanding of the distinct roles of both properties.
21See Herriges et al. (2004) for a more precise understanding of use and existence value.
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Figure 2: Types of Nonessentiality.
For our purposes there are two problems with this formal characterization.22 The ﬁrst is
technical in that the equation has no meaning if z is not a continuous real variable, severely
limiting the range of possible nonmarket goods as described in the ﬁrst section. The second
problem is conceptual. Explicitly, equation (5) is only a ﬁrst order marginal characterization
that looks like any one of the ﬁrst order optimality conditions that are so ubiquitous in
neoclassical microeconomics. However no existence value is not about a marginal utility
22The no existence value property is also sometimes characterized in terms of marginal indirect utility and
marginal expenditure (for example, Bradford and Hildebrandt (1977), Bockstael and McConnell (1993), and
Smith and Banzhaf (2004)). These characterizations also suﬀer from these two problems.
8condition and is also not about optimality. Equation (5) does not directly convey the key
intuition of no existence value that the consumer is indiﬀerent across all values of z.
As consequence of these two problems I instead primarily use a preference characteriza-
tion of no existence value: for any x ∈ X with x1 = 0 and any za,zb ∈ Z we have (x,za) ∼Y
(x,zb). The equivalent utility characterization requires that uY(x,za) = uY (x,zb).23 How-
ever it is technically characterized, it is clear that no existence value cannot be veriﬁed
from revealed preference and is hence an assumption, that is a “preference restriction” or
“maintained hypothesis.”
4 Exact welfare measurement
In this section I use the two weak complementarity preference properties to obtain an exact
welfare measure based on equations (3) and (4) by way of preference construction. For now
I only the consider the case where L = 2, so that in addition to the weak complement, good
one, we have good two that is usually described as a composite good.24 This restriction
permits more a intuitive presentation. However not all aspects of this development directly
generalize to longer commodity vectors. I deal with that issue at the end of section 6.
As discussed in section 2, the methodological problem of nonmarket good welfare analysis
stems from incomplete preference information across b Y . I will now construct a complete
preference relation on b Y using revealed preference and the two preference properties of weak
complementarity. This construction is based on fanned indiﬀerence curves graphical analysis
as developed by Smith and Banzhaf (2004) and presented in my Figure 3. This approach
involves overlaying indiﬀerence curves for multiple values of z in the same graph. Two
indiﬀerence curves for each of two z values are depicted in Figure 3, Ia
1 & Ia
2 for z = za
and Ib
1 & Ib
2 for z = zb. These and other indiﬀerence curves would be known from available
revealed preference, {%z |z ∈ Z}. Strong nonessentiality is indicated by all the indiﬀerence
curves intersecting the vertical axis with ﬁnite slopes. A “fan” is deﬁned as the collection
all indiﬀerence curves that intersect the vertical axis at the same point. I shall use the term
“handle” to refer to the point where an individual indiﬀerence curve intersects the vertical
axis, and hence the term “fan handle” for the intersection point of a fan of all the curves
23Willig (1978) also uses this utility equality characterization.
24Smith and Banzhaf (2004), and Palmquist (2005) also couch their development in this two good context.
9that share the same handle. Two representative fans are depicted in Figure 3, each with
two representative curves, located respectively at the fan handles deﬁned by the good two
values x1
2 and x2
2. Actually, there are fan handles located at each positive value along the
vertical axis and each fan includes an indiﬀerence curve for each value of z, which for most
applications is inﬁnite.
x1
x2
x1
2
x2
2
Ib
1
Ia
1
Ib
2
Ia
2
Figure 3: Fanning indiﬀerence curves for weak complementarity.
The no existence value assumption tells us that the consumer is indiﬀerent between
indiﬀerence curves belonging to the same fan, so that each fan deﬁnes an indiﬀerence set
across both x and z values. Since each (x,z) ∈ b Y belongs to a unique z-indiﬀerence curve
which in turn belongs to a unique fan, we have fully partitioned b Y into a set of indiﬀerence
sets. Monotonicity imposes a strict preference ordering on the fan handles that increases with
the x2 value. This ordering carries over to the fans themselves so that we have a complete
and transitive preference relation on b Y designated by %wc.25 In terms of the discussion at the
25This weak complementarity preference relation may be precisely deﬁned in terms revealed preference.
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y . With nonessentiality there exists unique (0,xα
2) ∈ b Xza and (0,x
β
2) ∈ b Xzb such that
(0,xα
2) ∼za (xa) and (0,x
β
2) ∼zb (xb). From strong monotonicity of %za we have (0,xα
2) %za (0,x
β
2) ⇐⇒
xα
2 ≥ x
β
2, and hence from transitivity of %za, have xa %za (0,x
β
2) ⇐⇒ xα
2 ≥ x
β
2. Since the weak comple-
mentarity preference relation must be consistent with revealed preference, we have
￿
(0,x
β
2),zb￿
∼wc (xb,zb)
and (xa,za) %wc
￿
(0,x
β
2),za￿
⇐⇒ xα
2 ≥ x
β
2. With no existence value,
￿
(0,x
β
2),za￿
∼wc
￿
(0,x
β
2),zb￿
. The
10very end of section 2, the construction of %wc is based on a complete one-to-one alignment
between the Iz where the fans deﬁne the partition of I. As required, each Pj (each fan)
includes exactly one indiﬀerence surface of %z for each z ∈ Z. The relation %wc is well
deﬁned and hence unique. However since its construction depends on the no existence value
assumption, we do not know if it is the same as the unknown original relation %b Y .
Following equation (3), given a change in the nonmarket good value from za to zb (with
za,zb ∈ Z), a compensating measure of the change in welfare based on weak complementarity
requires for any ¯ p = (¯ p1, ¯ p2) ∈ ℜ2
++ and ¯ w > 0, that we be able to produce some real number
∆W such that,
(b x(¯ p,z
a, ¯ w),z
a) ∼wc
￿
b x
￿
¯ p,z
b, ¯ w − ∆W
￿
,z
b￿
. (6)
I provide a graphical geometric procedure here for specifying ∆W followed by a parallel
computational process using the uz utility functions. With equation (6), we have an equiva-
lence statement in the context of weak complementarity and are therefore working with the
single fan that includes the point xa = b x(¯ p,za, ¯ w), as depicted in Figure 4. All we need to
do is plot tangents lines with slope −¯ p1/¯ p2 to both the za and zb indiﬀerence curves of that
fan. The vertical distance between these two lines is |∆W/¯ p2| and the horizontal distance is
|∆W/¯ p1|. ∆W is positive if the za tangent line is above the other and negative otherwise.
∆W can be calculated with the uz utility functions by following these steps that emulate
the preceding graphical approach: 1) starting with xa = (xa
1,xa
2), calculate the utility value
¯ ua = uza(xa); 2) solve the equation uza(0,xh
2) = ¯ ua for the handle value xh
2; 3) ﬁnd the zb
utility value at the handle, ¯ ub = uzb(0,xh
2); 4) ﬁnd the zb-Hicksian demand for ¯ p and ¯ ub,
xb = (xb
1,xb
2) by solving the system of two equations, uzb(xb) = ¯ ub and
∂uzb
∂x1
(x
b)
∂uzb
∂x2
(x
b)
=
¯ p1
¯ p2
;
and ﬁnally 5) calculate ∆W = ¯ p1(xa
1 − xb
1) + ¯ p2(xa
2 − xb
2). Aspects of this construction are
also illustrated in Figure 4.
For many applications it is useful to have a utility function that represents %wc on
b Y . I next develop a utility function that is calibrated by the handle values. With strong
transitivity of %wc follows from the transitivity of the relation ≥ on the quantity x2. With this transitivity
we obtain (xa,za) %wc (xb,zb) ⇐⇒ xα
2 ≥ x
β
2 so that %wc is complete. This construction works with both
za = zb and za  = zb (as well as with both xa = xb and xa  = xb).
11x1
x2
xh
2
xa
xb
Ia
Ib
∆W/¯ p2
Slope: −¯ p1/¯ p2
Figure 4: Construction of exact welfare measure with weak complementarity.
nonessentiality and strong monotonicity, for any (x,z) ∈ b Y there must exist a unique quantity
of good two, xh
2, such that uz(x) = uz(0,xh
2). I deﬁne the weak complementarity utility value
of (x,z) to be xh
2, uwc(x,z) = xh
2. Thus for all (x,z) ∈ b Y ,
uwc(x,z) =
￿
x
h
2 > 0|uz(x) = uz(0,x
h
2)
￿
.
With this function, all (x,z) elements on the same fan have the same utility value and higher
utility values are assigned to those fans with larger handle values. It is clear that uwc repre-
sents %wc on b Y and is unique up to a monotonic transformation.26 With it and the demand
function we can construct an indirect utility function vwc (p,z,w) = uwc(b x(p,z,w),z), by
solving u = vwc (p,z,w) for w we can obtain the expenditure function w = ewc (p,z,u), and
we construct the Hicksian demand function hwc(p,z,u) = b x(p,z,ewc (p,z,u)). The construc-
tion of uwc, vwc, ewc and hwc does not require any calculus except for initially determining
the individual uz functions, and therefore works equally well with discrete and continuous
nonmarket goods. Again without resorting to calculus, these constructions can be used
for exact welfare analysis. For ¯ p ∈ ℜ2
++, ¯ w > 0 and za,zb ∈ Z, the weak complementar-
ity compensating variation for a change from za to zb is ∆W = ¯ w − ewc
￿
¯ p,zb, ˆ ua
￿
where
ˆ ua = vwc (¯ p,za, ¯ w).
26For each z ∈ Z, uwc is also a monotonic transformation of uz so that there exists some z-speciﬁc real
valued function fz such that uwc(x,z) = fz (uz(x)) for all x ∈ b Xz.
125 Unnecessary assumptions
In this section I discuss two other assumptions that are often adopted in the literature in
conjunction with weak complementarity, and also consider doing without strong nonessen-
tiality. Part of my message is that we can obtain an exact welfare measure without these
assumptions, indicating that a preference-theoretic approach may be more parsimonious in
its need for additional information and hence more eﬃcient in its use of the available prefer-
ence information in the form of revealed preference. However this literature generally does
not explicitly utilize my strongest assumption, that we can recover revealed preference in
the form of all the z-ﬁxed relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and their respective representative utility
functions. This literature does universally assume the availability of complete individual
Marshallian demand functions of the form b x(p,z,w), and also includes much discussion of
what can and cannot be known from revealed preference but without actually specifying
revealed preference. This paper provides an explicit examination of what can be done with
the revealed preference available from Marshallian demand and the two deﬁning properties
of weak complementarity.
The most pervasive and crucial additional assumption is that the nonmarket good is a
continuous real variable and that demand and utility are both diﬀerentiable with respect to
it.27 The continuity assumption by itself severely limits the range of possible applications,
excluding discrete nonmarket goods as well as continuousness nonmarket goods with incom-
plete data. Requiring continuous information for the analysis of a discrete change seems
to be superﬂuous. Imposing diﬀerentially on top of this may further restrict the range of
applications. The current theoretical literature on weak complementarity is dominated by a
discussion on the use and possible necessity of invoking the Willig condition to obtain exact
welfare measures.28 Originally presented in Willig (1978), this is actually three equivalent
conditions concerning the partial derivatives of Marshallian demand and indirect utility with
respect to z. Consequently, this discussion cannot have any relevance to discrete nonmarket
goods. Furthermore, the Willig condition is not observable from revealed preference so that
invoking it imposes an additional assumption. It is true that continuity and diﬀerentiability
27With the exception of Herriges et al. (2004), all of the nonmarket goods literature cited in this article
relies on this assumption for their core developments.
28This discussion includes Bockstael and McConnell (1993), Smith and Banzhaf (2004), Palmquist (2005),
Bullock and Minot (2006) and von Haefen (2007). Bullock and Minot (2006) show that the Willig condition
is not necessary for exact welfare analysis.
13are necessary for some welfare measures such as various marginal willingness to pay metrics.
With those assumptions, such measures can still be developed with the uwc, vwc, ewc and hwc
functions as speciﬁed here. Nothing presented here precludes the use of calculus techniques.
A monotonic preference on the nonmarket good is often assumed in the context of weak
complementarity.29 Although typically speciﬁed as a partial derivative inequality such that
uY strictly increases in value with z, this “goodness” assumption can be equivalently deﬁned
as requiring for all za,zb ∈ Z where Z ⊆ ℜ that zb > za ⇒ (x,zb) ≻Y (x,za) for all
x ∈ X.30 However this violates no existence value for those points in X where x1 = 0.31 I
will therefore restrict the goodness assumption to those points in X where x1  = 0. The fans
presented in both Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this restricted notion of goodness. For each of
these three fans, the Ia indiﬀerence curve is above the Ib curve to the right of the vertical
axis, indicating that zb is preferred over za with weak complementarity.32 If with all fans of
a given application, the Ia curve is always above the Ib curve, then zb is universally regarded
as better than za (i.e., for all values of x ∈ X with x1  = 0).
However goodness is not necessary for implementing weak complementarity. For example
consider the twisted fans presented in Figure 5. Goodness is violated with zb preferred over
za to the left of the dashed line and za preferred over zb to the right. This lack of goodness has
no eﬀect on the constructions presented in the proceeding section. In particular, we can still
deﬁne the weak complementarity preference relation by treating each fan as an indiﬀerence
set in b Y and ranking the fans by handle value. Moreover, we can do this no matter how
tangled and knotted the fans may be. Most of the weak complementarity examples in the
literature, such as M¨ aler’s ﬁshery quality, invoke an intuition for goodness. However goodness
is not necessary for implementing weak complementarity, broadening the range of possible
applications.
As deﬁned here, revealed preference is restricted to the b Xz sets. Consequently with only
29Bockstael and McConnell (1993), Neill (1999), Herriges et al. (2004), Smith and Banzhaf (2004), and
von Haefen (2007) impose this assumption with weak complementarity. Ebert (1998) uses it in a diﬀerent
context.
30See Brown (2008) for a more in depth preference-theoretic consideration of goodness.
31None of the papers cited in footnote 29 indicate awareness of this technical contradiction.
32Let xα be any point on the Ia curve of one of these fans (with xα
1  = 0) and let xβ be the point on the Ib
curve just below it, so that xα
1 = x
β
1. Since they are on the same fan, xα ∼wc xβ. With strong monotonicity,
it follows that zb is preferred over za in order to compensate for the smaller amount of good two and thereby
achieve indiﬀerence.
14x1
x2
x1
2
x2
2
Ib
1
Ia
1
Ib
2
Ia
2
Figure 5: Simple tangled fans.
weak nonessentiality, revealed preference does not include that portion of X where x1 = 0,
and it is not possible to construct %wc as we have from all of the %z. However we can extend
the revealed preference domain for each z ∈ Z to include the vertical axis.
For any ﬁxed z ∈ Z, let Iz
α and Iz
β be any two distinct indiﬀerence curves deﬁned by %z.
Without loss of generality we may assume that Iz
α is superior to Iz
β. All the points in both
curves are elements of b Xz. Therefore with only weak nonessentiality, generally neither of
these revealed indiﬀerence curves will include a point on the vertical axis (the curves end
just before the axis much like the end of an open line segment). Let x1
1 be a positive value
of good one that is included in both indiﬀerence sets.33 Then with strong monotonicity, all
good one quantities x1 ∈ (0,x1
1] are also included in both indiﬀerence curves. Let {xn
1}∞
n=1
be a decreasing sequence with elements from (0,x1
1] such that limn→∞ xn
1 = 0. For each xn
1
in the sequence, let xn
2α and xn
2β be the respective values of good two such that (xn
1,xn
2α) ∈
Iz
α and (xn
1,xn
2β) ∈ Iz
β. Then for all n = 1,...,∞, (xn
1,xn
2α) ≻z (xn
1,xn
2β) and hence also
((xn
1,xn
2α),z) ≻b Y
￿
(xn
1,xn
2β),z
￿
. Let xα = limn→∞(xn
1,xn
2α) and xβ = limn→∞(xn
1,xn
2β). With
weak nonessentiality, these two points are well deﬁned as they are the required intersections
of the respective original %Y indiﬀerence curves with the vertical axis, such as depicted in
33It is possible that not all positive quantities are included, such as with quasilinear preference.
15panel (b) of Figure 2. Then since %Y is continuous on X, we have (xα,z) ≻Y
￿
xβ,z
￿
. We
have thus extended all of the revealed preference indiﬀerence curves to includes points on
the vertical axis.
Thus with weak nonessentiality we are able to recover the %Y preference over all of X
for each ﬁxed value of z, just as we did previously with strong nonessentiality and revealed
preference on each b Xz. We can then use the same general construction techniques for speci-
fying a weak complementarity preference relation and exact welfare measures using the fans
as indiﬀerence sets. The limit points obtained above are the handles of those fans. The
distinction between weak and strong nonessentiality is generally discussed in the literature
in terms of inﬁnite versus ﬁnite choke prices. Recently Bullock and Minot (2006) have shown
that it is not possible to implement weak complementarity with inﬁnite choke prices (weak
nonessentiality) using welfare measures deﬁned by paths of integration in (p,z) space. Thus
with a preference-theoretic methodology we are again able to go beyond what is possible
with standard calculus techniques.
6 Testing no existence value
For the proceeding two sections there were only two market goods. When there are more
than two goods it is possible for revealed preference to be inconsistent with no existence
value so that weak complementarity is not feasible. In this section I show this and provide
generalizations of the welfare constructions presented in section 4.
It is well understood that there are an inﬁnite number of diverse preference relations
on b Y that are consistent with revealed preference.34 It follows that there can be no test
on revealed preference for verifying that the “true” relation %b Y satisﬁes no existence value.
Many authors have generalized this to state that there can be no test at all, implying that we
cannot use revealed preference to determine in any way whether or not the relation satisﬁes
no existence value.35 However this generalization is fallacious. The inability to aﬃrm that
34Herriges et al. (2004) and von Haefen (2007) provide a clear statements of this in terms of utility function
transformations.
35For example Bockstael and McConnell (1993, p. 1256) conclude that “weak complementarity is an
untestable hypothesis,” Herriges et al. (2004, p. 56) describe the choice between alternative welfare measures
as “the choice between non-testable preference restrictions,” and von Haefen (2007, p. 16) characterizes weak
complementarity as an “intuitive but untestable restriction.” Ebert (2001, p. 374) states that “one is unable
16%b Y satisﬁes no existence value does imply an inability to deny it. We can use revealed
preference to deny or falsify the possibility of no existence value. No existence value cannot
be true for any of the many feasible preference relations on b Y when it is inconsistent with
revealed preference.
In section 4, with L = 2 and observed strong nonessentiality, we speciﬁed a weak com-
plementarity preference relation that could not be falsiﬁed by revealed preference. Therefore
falsiﬁcation is only possible with a larger number of market goods. I shall begin by working
with L = 3 where it is still possible to use graphical imagery and geometric intuition. As
we go from two to three market goods, keeping good one as the weak complement, all of
the graphical components increase by one dimension. For example, previously indiﬀerence
sets were simple curves but are now surfaces. With strict convexity, these surfaces would
look something like sails in a full wind. The important region of X deﬁned by x1 = 0,
X0
1 = {x ∈ X |x1 = 0}, previously the vertical axis, is now a quarter plane taking on all
nonnegative combinations of the other two goods. Previously the indiﬀerence sets inter-
sected with this region at single points. Now with curved surfaces intersecting a plane, these
indiﬀerence set handles are curves.
This is depicted in Figure 6 with two such curves, one indiﬀerence surface handle each
for two nonmarket good values, za,zb ∈ Z. These curves would be observable with strong
nonessentiality and our deﬁnition of revealed preference.36 Suppose that two handles cross
as depicted at a single point x1. Then there must be a point such as x2 that is on one of
these two curves but not the other. In this case, from revealed preference we have x1 ∼za
x2 ⇒ (x1,za) ∼b Y (x2,za). Now suppose that the original preference relation on b Y satisﬁes
no existence value so that we also have (x1,za) ∼b Y (x1,zb) and (x2,za) ∼b Y (x2,zb). Then
by transitivity we get (x1,zb) ∼b Y (x2,zb) and hence x1 ∼zb x2 which directly contradicts the
observed deﬁning characteristic of x2. Thus with the revealed preference scenario depicted
in Figure 6, we are able to refute or falsify the no existence value preference restriction.
Ebert (1998, p. 242) states that preference restrictions are untestable in general because
“there are no observable implications of the properties imposed.” However there can be
observable implications and from Figure 6 we can discern the observable implications of
weak complementarity. Falsiﬁcation of no existence value is possible with this revealed
to reject” preference restrictions.
36Or with weak nonessentiality and an extended revealed preference using continuity, such as developed
at the end of section 5.
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Figure 6: Falsifying no existence value with revealed preference
preference scenario because the za indiﬀerence set handle including x1 is not coincident with
the zb indiﬀerence set handle that also includes x1. With general L, strong nonessentiality,
no existence value and any za,zb ∈ Z, let Ia
h be a za indiﬀerence set handle. Thus Ia
h ⊂ X0
1
and x1 ∼za x2 for all x1,x2 ∈ Ia
h. Let x1,x2 ∈ Ia
h and let Ib
h be the zb indiﬀerence set handle
that includes x1. Then as before, from no existence value and transitivity of %b Y we have
x1 ∼zb x2 so that x2 ∈ Ib
h and hence Ia
h = Ib
h. Thus the set of indiﬀerence set handles
is invariant across z values. I call this condition “single-preference on X0
1.” No existence
value is not feasible without single-preference. This is a trivial consequence when L = 2
and all indiﬀerence set handles are single points, but not trivial when L ≥ 3. With strong
nonessentiality, single-preference is observable from revealed preference. We thus have an
observable consequence from imposing no existence value. Stated in the other direction,
when L ≥ 3 the absence of single-preference is a testable condition that allows us to reject
no existence value and with it weak complementarity.
If revealed preference exhibits single-preference on X0
1, we can generalize the welfare
constructions developed in section 4 for general L. We constructed %wc by associating all
the observable indiﬀerence sets with a common handle. These super indiﬀerence sets are the
18fans of Smith and Banzhaf. They are well deﬁned with general L and single-preference on
X0
1. Strong monotonicity imposes a strict ordering on the fan handles so that %wc is well
deﬁned on b Y . With monotonicity each fan handle includes a single point on the “45o line”
in X0
1. These points are of the form (0,xh
2,...,xh
L) where xh
2 = xh
3 = ... = xh
L. We can
generalize the utility function uwc that represents %wc by assigning this common commodity
value to all (x,z) elements of the fan. The vwc, ewc and hwc functions can then be deﬁned as
before. The geometric procedure for specifying ∆W is generalized by using tangent planes
when L = 3 and tangent hyperplanes when L ≥ 4.
7 Conclusions
The weak complementarity methodological literature is almost entirely based on construc-
tions in diﬀerential and integral calculus.37 Preference-theoretic characterizations and con-
structions, such as those provided here, oﬀer an alternative methodological approach that
can supplement calculus-based methods. In particular, our preference-theoretic characteri-
zation of weak complementarity allows us to directly construct a welfare measure based on
an explicit speciﬁcation of revealed preference. This provides a clarity in our understand-
ing of the role of revealed preference that is not available with the usual calculus-based
methodologies. Over reliance on calculus methodology also seems to foster carelessness in
the characterization of some preference properties such as with nonessentiality. The rigor
and intrinsic transparency required by direct preference construction mitigates against this
lack of precision, and can also yield more intuitive and direct characterizations such as with
no existence value. Our exact welfare measure requires neither a continuous nonmarket
good, nor monotonic preference on the nonmarket good, demonstrating that the preference-
theoretic approach can be more frugal in the use of preference information and assumptions.
Furthermore, this measure can be easily extended to accommodate inﬁnite choke prices,
which is not possible with current integral deﬁnitions of welfare. Thus weak complementar-
ity can be applied in many contexts that are not feasible with pure calculus constructions.
Finally, while several authors working in the realm of calculus have indicated it was impos-
sible, I have obtained a nontrivial observable condition that is necessary for the feasibility of
no existence value. The presence or absence of this single-preference condition in revealed
preference is thus a negative test of no existence value, and with it, weak complementarity.
37One exception is Herriges et al. (2004).
19Taken altogether, this preference-theoretic approach allows us to do more with less.
I do not advocate completely replacing calculus with preference-theoretic modeling. Each
of these methodologies has its advantages. Calculus is an exact tool for understanding the
consequences of inﬁnitesimal changes and also allows us to take advantage of the special
properties of continuous and diﬀerentiable functions. However, it is typically not a precise
tool for understanding information content as with multiple sources of preference information
(revealed and assumed). Combining preference-theoretic and calculus-based methodologies
would allow the researcher to distinguish between, on the one hand, revealed preference con-
ditions necessary for the feasibility of a preference restriction, and on the other hand, analytic
properties that are most convenient for actually specifying an applicable welfare measure.
Nevertheless, the utility of calculus is substantially diminished in some circumstances such
as with discrete nonmarket goods and inﬁnite choke prices.
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